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Summary 
The evolution of large-scale cooperation among genetic strangers is a fundamental 
unanswered question in the social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown 
that so called ‘strong reciprocity’ plays a key role in accounting for the endogenous 
enforcement of cooperation. Insofar as strongly reciprocal players are willing to costly 
sanction defectors, cooperation flourishes. However, experimental evidence unambiguously 
indicates that not only defection and strong reciprocity, but also unconditional cooperation 
is a quantitatively important behavioral attitude. By referring to a prisoner’s dilemma 
framework where punishment (‘stick’) and rewarding (‘carrot’) options are available, here 
we show analytically that the presence of cooperators who don’t punish in the population makes 
altruistic punishment evolutionarily weak. We show that cooperation breaks down and 
strong reciprocity is maladaptive if costly punishment means ‘punishing defectors’ and, even 
more so, if it is coupled with costly rewarding of cooperators. In contrast, punishers don’t 
perish if cooperators, far from being rewarded, are sanctioned. These results, based on an 
extended notion of strong reciprocity, challenge evolutionary explanations of cooperation 
that overlook the ‘dark side’ of altruistic behavior. 
 
Keywords: Cooperation, Strong Reciprocity, Altruistic Punishment, Altruistic Rewarding, 
Heterogeneous Types 
 















Address for correspondence: 
 
Angelo Antoci 
University of Sassari 
via Muroni 25 
07100 Sassari  
Italy 
E-mail: angelo.antoci@virgilio.it Punish and Perish? 
 
 
Angelo Antoci, DEIR, University of Sassari, via Muroni 25, 07100 Sassari (Italy). 
E-mail: angelo.antoci@virgilio.it 




The evolution of large-scale cooperation among genetic strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the 
social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown that so called ‘strong reciprocity’ plays a key 
role in accounting for the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar as strongly reciprocal players are 
willing to costly sanction defectors, cooperation flourishes. However, experimental evidence unambiguously 
indicates that not only defection and strong reciprocity, but also unconditional cooperation is a quantitatively 
important behavioral attitude. By referring to a prisoner’s dilemma framework where punishment (‘stick’) and 
rewarding (‘carrot’) options are available, here we show analytically that that the presence of cooperators who 
don’t punish in the population makes altruistic punishment evolutionarily weak. We show that cooperation 
breaks down and strong reciprocity is maladaptive if costly punishment means ‘punishing defectors’ and, 
even more so, if it is coupled with costly rewarding of cooperators. In contrast, punishers don’t perish if 
cooperators, far from being rewarded, are sanctioned. These results, based on an extended notion of strong 
reciprocity,  challenge  evolutionary  explanations  of  cooperation  that  overlook  the  ‘dark  side’  of  altruistic 
behavior. 
Key words: Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Altruistic Punishment; Altruistic Rewarding; Heterogeneous 
Types. 
JEL Classification: C7; D7; Z1.  
 
1. Introduction 
Even though the evolution of cooperation among humans has been extensively studied in the last decades (see 
e.g.  the  famous  work  by  Axelrod,  1984),  a  crucial  question  remains  largely  open:  how  can  large-scale 
cooperation endogenously emerge and be successfully sustained over time? Recent research has persuasively 
argued that invoking explanations based on more or less sophisticated forms of ‘enlightened self-interest’ 
alone,  such  as  kin  selection  (Hamilton,  1964),  repeated  encounters  (Fudenberg  and  Maskin,  1986),  and 
reputation  formation,  is  not  sufficient  for  accounting  for  the  evidence  available  about  the  relevance  of 
cooperation within several significant human contexts where collective action problems naturally arise but 
interactions  involve  genetically  unrelated  individuals.  As  both  theoretical  contributions  and  empirical 
evidence confirm, insofar as altruists are grouped together and mainly interact among themselves, within a 
neighborhood  structure  (Eshel  et  al.,  1998),  exploitation  on  the  part  of  free  riders  can  be  prevented  by 
restricting access to the gains from cooperation. Unlike these studies, we depart from close-knit parochial 
communities and test the survival potential of pro-social behavior within a more ‘hostile’ environment where 
neither group selection nor assortative interactions are allowed, and develop an evolutionary game-theoretical 
analysis aimed at investigating the diffusion of cooperation when exogenous enforcement devices are not 
available.  
In recent years, a growing body of experimental evidence has convincingly shown that so called ‘strong 
reciprocity’ is a powerful device for the enforcement of cooperation, despite the presence of large proportions 
of selfish subjects (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gintis et al., 2005; Gächter and Herrmann, 2010). The key feature 
of strong reciprocators is their willingness to incur costs in order to conditionally cooperate and punish non-
cooperators.  However,  in  a  lively  interdisciplinary  debate  currently  involving  economists,  biologists  and 
social psychologists (see on this Fehr and Henrich, 2003), critics argue that strong reciprocity is maladaptive, 
in the sense that it is evolutionarily weak and has no adaptive power (Dreber et al., 2008). 
Hence, the following question naturally arises: can strong reciprocity survive and favor the enforcement 
of cooperation, within a behaviorally heterogeneous population in which also non-reciprocating players are 
involved? The existence of heterogeneous types is being increasingly confirmed by experimental research
1. In 
particular, available lab evidence indicates that (a) a significant proportion are unconditionally cooperative 
(e.g. systematically cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma or make positive contributions in public goods or 
dictator games) and (b) a significant proportion of subjects are self-interested and tend to free ride on others’ 
                                                 
1 Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), by means of a new methodological strategy, both account for the existence of types in the lab 
and, through a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation, show that a large part of the dynamics of free 
riding is explained by the interaction of heterogeneous types.  
generosity (by defecting from the outset). Further, (c) most subjects who act neither purely selfishly nor 
simply altruistically seem to be strong reciprocators (Carpenter et al., 2009). 
However, it is worth pointing out that strong reciprocity is often viewed as something more than costly 
punishment  of  non-cooperators:  in  many  existing  works  on  the  theme,  a  strongly  reciprocal  player  is 
generically defined as a person who is willing to bear costs to be kind to those who are being kind (by 
cooperating and rewarding them; strong positive reciprocity) and to be mean to those who are being mean (by 
defecting and punishing them; strong negative reciprocity; Fehr et al., 2002). A relevant problem with this 
definition is that it takes for granted that if a person is willing to be kind to those who are being kind, she will 
also be mean to those who are being mean (or viceversa). By contrast, several experimental papers (see e.g. 
Abbink et al., 2000; Offerman, 2002; Reuben and van Winden, 2010) show that strong positive reciprocity 
need not be the flip-side of strong negative reciprocity. Moreover, a further extension of the notion of strong 
reciprocity is in order as some new studies interestingly reveal that punishers target their sanctions not only to 
defectors but also, to a significant extent, to other cooperators (Herrmann et al., 2008; Goette et al., 2010; 
Abbink et al., 2010; Gächter and Herrmann, 2010). This suggests that, on both conceptual and empirical 
grounds, strong reciprocity has a plural nature. In the light of this, in this paper we decompose such behavioral 
attitude  by  introducing  a  taxonomy  of  strongly  reciprocal  players.  Next,  we  comparatively  lay  out  the 
evolutionary foundations of the varieties of strong reciprocity we identify within a behaviorally heterogeneous 
social environment where also unconditional defectors and unconditional cooperators are initially present. 
This  will  allow  us  to  explore  –  to  our  knowledge  for  the  first  time  –  the  different  medium-long  run 
implications which can be drawn, for society at large, depending on the variety of strong reciprocity one refers 
to.   
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the main features of the 
analytical  model.  Section  3  analyzes  social  dynamics  for  each  of  the  variants  of  strong  reciprocity  we 




2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma with Carrot and Stick 
We consider a large-scale population of individuals enjoying the benefits of a given collective (i.e. non-rival 
and non-excludable) good. In this society, three player types are initially present: Unconditional Defectors 
(UDs, hereafter ‘defectors’ only, for simplicity), Unconditional Cooperators (UCs, hereafter ‘cooperators’) 
and Strong Reciprocators (SRs). The existence and quantitative relevance of these behavioral types is being 
increasingly confirmed in laboratory environments, within the framework of prisoner’s dilemma and public  
good game experiments (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Ones and Putterman, 
2007; Camera and Casari, 2009; Carpenter et al., 2009). As we anticipated above, we take the inherently 
plural nature of strong reciprocity into account and model it by introducing a taxonomy of SR types. Infinitely 
many random encounters occur between two individuals at a time and, whenever two players meet, their 
behavior affects each other’s enjoyment of the collective good. Besides, type recognition holds: players are 
supposed to be able to identify their co-player’s type in each pairwise matching
2. This feature of the model is 
in common with models of good standing (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004) as well as previous evolutionary 
work on altruistic punishment (Fowler, 2005). In each matching, we assume that the material consequences 
for the players are captured by a two-stage Prisoner’s Dilemma with Carrot and Stick (PDCS) game. In the 
first  stage  (the  Cooperation  stage),  the  material  consequences  depend  on  players’  choices  between 
‘Cooperate’ (C) and ‘Defect’ (D) only. Hence, each matching between two individuals will produce one of the 
following  four  outcomes:  (D,  D),  (C,  C),  (C,  D),  (D,  C).  We  suppose  that,  from  the  viewpoint  of  the 
individual  player,  the  material  consequences  of  these  four  possible  outcomes  have  the  structure  of  the 
prisoner’s dilemma, with  d b a g > > >  (see the left side of Table 1). Mutual cooperation Pareto-dominates 
mutual defection and free riding, by exploiting the non-excludability of the good to be provided and the 
opponent’s  cooperation,  is  the  most  individually  rewarding  outcome,  in  material  terms.  Players  behave 
according  to  their  type.  Hence,  while  UCs  play  C  and  UDs  play  D  in  each  matching  (regardless  of  the 
opponent’s type), SRs play C when matched with another SR or with a UC player, and play D when matched 
with a UD player (see the right side of Table 1). 
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Table 1: PD game and material payoffs (Stage 1) 
 
In  the  second  stage  (the  Punishment/Reward  stage),  players  have  to  choose  among  Punish,  P  (‘stick’), 
Reward,  R  (‘carrot’)  and  Neither,  N  (that  is,  abstaining  from  both  punishment  and  rewarding).  Each  SR 
chooses N if matched with a player of the same type. Further, we suppose that while both UCs and UDs 
                                                 
2 Though throughout the paper we retain this information assumption, it is worth pointing out that most of our results can be 
obtained also if we suppose that players can observe their opponent’s type only ex post, that is after playing the first stage of the 
material game.   
systematically  abstain from punishing and/or rewarding others, SR types are  classified according to their 
choices  (P,  R  or  N)  when  matched  with  UCs  and  UDs  (see  the  left  side  of  Table  2).  In  particular,  we 
separately consider five types of players who act identically in the first stage – that is, they play C (resp., D) 
when matched with either a UC or another SR (resp., a UD) – but differ as to their strategic choice in the 
second stage. In particular, as the left side of Table 2 shows, we specifically focus on (1) strong negative 
reciprocators (SNRs), who only punish defectors; (2) strong positive reciprocators (SPRs), who only reward 
cooperators; (3) symmetric strong reciprocators (SSRs), who both punish defectors and reward cooperators; 
(4) punishers of non-punishing cooperators (PNPs), who only punish cooperators and, finally, (5) hyper-
strong negative reciprocators (HSNRs), who punish both cooperators and defectors
3. The matrix on the right 
of Table 2 provides us with the material payoffs at stage 2, where ɛ = cost of being punished, λ = cost of 
punishing,  π  =  cost  of  rewarding,  η  =  benefit  from  being  rewarded  and  h p e l   ,   ,   ,   are  strictly  positive 
parameters.  This  means  that,  as  it  is  often  true  both  in  naturally  occurring  environments  (Sethi  and 
Somanathan, 1996) as well as in laboratory experiments (Gächter and Herrmann, 2010), punishing (resp., 
rewarding) is a costly activity for the punisher (resp., rewarder).  
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Table 2: SRs’ classification and material payoffs (Stage 2) 
 
 
We  claim  that  the  two-stage  structure  of  the  PDCS  allows  us  to  go  beyond  a  further  limitation  which 
characterizes  existing  studies  on  strong  reciprocity,  that  is  their  inability  to  sharply  distinguish  between 
implicit and explicit forms of rewarding and punishment. With regard to rewarding, one may argue that, for 
example in a prisoner’s dilemma game, deciding to cooperate with a cooperator entails in itself sacrificing 
resources to be kind towards (i.e. to reward) a person being kind (strong positive reciprocity), since the same 
                                                 
3 Though our analysis includes forms of strong reciprocity leading to punishment of cooperators, it is worth pointing out that in this 
paper we leave aside the interesting phenomenon of defectors punishing cooperators (the so called ‘antisocial punishment’). For a 
recent theoretical work on the impact of anti-social punishment on the evolution of cooperation, see Rand et al. (2010).  
person  would  have  obtained  a  larger  material  benefit  by  defecting  (rather  than  by  cooperating)  with  a 
cooperating player. Analogously, defection can be seen as an implicit means of punishing defectors. The Folk 
Theorem literature provides us with two famous examples of implicit punishment via defection such as Tit-
for-Tat
 and the Grim Trigger strategy. By contrast, the structure of the PDCS allows us to incorporate two 
levels of punishment and rewarding into the analysis, so that strong reciprocity turns out to be a behavioral 
attitude  characterized  by  both  conditional  niceness  (i.e.  willingness  to  cooperate  with  cooperators  and  to 





3. The evolutionary game-theoretical model: do punishers perish? 
As we made clear in the previous section, in our evolutionary game-theoretical model player types prescribe 
the behavioral patterns which, via pairwise matchings, determine specific material consequences. In turn, such 
material consequences drive social evolution, in the sense that the types which turn out to be more rewarding 
– in material terms – are imitated and, by replicating faster, manage to spread over at the expense of less 
rewarding ones. Time is continuous and the population is modelled as a continuum of players. As far as 
pairwise matchings are concerned, the material game that individuals play is the previously described two-
stage PDCS game. We represent the state of the population of individuals by the vector  ( )
3
3 2 1 , , R x x x x Î = , 
where  1 x ,  2 x  and  3 x  indicate the shares of individuals of the types UC, SR and UD, respectively. Thus 
0 ³ i x , for all i, and ∑ =
i
i x 1; so x belongs to the 2-dimensional simplex S (see Figure 1). Let us indicate by 
A the payoff matrix of the PDCS game associated with the material payoffs related to both stage 1 and stage 2 
(see Tables 1 and 2), whose entries  ij a  depend on the specific SR type considered and represent the row 





a a a UD
a a a SR
a a a UC
UD SR UC
A =           (1) 
 
                                                 
4 The distinction between implicit and explicit punishment and rewarding is in line with experimental evidence, indicating that 
subjects often behave differently according to whether they are provided or not with explicit opportunities to directly target their 
sanctions and/or rewards towards other players (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; 2005).  
Given the pairwise random matching structure of the game, the (expected) material payoffs for UCs, SRs and 
UDs are, respectively: 
 
3 33 2 32 1 31
3 23 2 22 1 21
3 13 2 12 1 11
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Following Taylor and Jonker (1978), we assume that the growth rates  i i i i x dt dx x x / ) / ( / = &  of the shares are 
given by the well-known replicator equations (see also Weibull, 1995): 
 
( ) P - P = UC x x 1 1 &  
( ) P - P = SR x x 2 2 &             (2) 
( ) P - P = UD x x 3 3 &  
where: 
UD SR UC x x x P + P + P = P 3 2 1  
 












Figure 1: The 2-dimensional simplex S 
  
 
Our formalization allows us to directly draw implications about the social dynamics taking place within large-
scale  three-type  populations  in  which  cooperators  and  defectors  initially  coexist  with  strong  negative 
reciprocators (SNRs), strong positive reciprocators (SPRs), symmetric strong reciprocators (SSRs), punishers 
of non-punishing cooperators (PNPs) and hyper-strong negative reciprocators (HSNRs), respectively. 
The dynamic system (2) is analyzed in the Mathematical Appendix by using the classification due to Bomze 
(1983) for replicator equations.  In the following subsections we illustrate the basic features of dynamics 
generated by (2) by separately focusing on each of the five varieties of strong reciprocity under exam. 
In Figures 2-6, attractive stationary states are indicated by full dots, repulsive ones by open dots and saddle 
points by drawing their stable and unstable branches. The vertices  ) 0 , 0 , 1 ( 1 = e ,  ) 0 , 1 , 0 ( 2 = e  and  ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( 3 = e  of 
the simplex S (see Figure 1), which represent respectively the states where only types UC, SR and UD are 





Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics emerging when SRs display a willingness to costly punish defectors only 
(SNR), consistently with many laboratory studies (see Gintis et al., 2005), where a sizeable proportion of 
SNRs is identified. In such a context, the payoff matrix A becomes:  
 
β ε β γ UD
λ β α α SNR







Observe that a UC-UD-SNR population may end up either in a ‘bad’ stationary state (the vertex UD), where 
cooperators  and  strong  reciprocators  perish  and  all  players  are  defectors,  or  in  a  ‘good’  stationary  state 
belonging to the edge joining the vertices UC and SNR (every point of such an edge is a stationary state) 
where defectors perish, with positive proportions of cooperators and strong reciprocators. However, the latter 
evolutionary outcome is fragile and the maintenance of cooperation may be jeopardized: if the share of SNRs 
falls below a certain threshold in the polymorphic stationary states of the edge UC-SNR, such polymorphic 
configurations can be invaded by defectors. This result is in line with past evolutionary work (Sethi and 
Somanathan,  1996)  and  experimental  evidence  (Carpenter  et  al.,  2004)  revealing  that  when  ‘sufficiently  
many’ punishers are initially present, free riders are likely to be matched with agents reducing their payoffs, 
so that the former will be driven out of the population. At that point, since there will be no selection pressure 
against punishing players, the population shares stabilize. In such a case, a polymorphism with a positive 
proportion of two pro-social behavioral types (cooperators and (a high enough number of) punishers) and 
universal cooperation prevails. In our analysis, we also find that, other things being equal, as defectors’ costs 
of being punished increase, the basin of attraction of the vertex UD becomes smaller (see the Mathematical 
Appendix). This can be seen as an evolutionary confirmation of what Sethi and Somanathan (1996) refer to as 
the centrepiece of economic reasoning, that is “the tendency of human behaviour to adjust in response to 
persistent differential in material incentives”.  
 





This case represents a scenario where cooperators and defectors coexist with players driven by SPR, that is 
conditional cooperators who are willing to incur costs to reward cooperators (altruistic rewarding), but abstain 
from punishing defectors, unlike agents driven by SNR. In such case, the payoff matrix A is given by:  
 
β β γ UD
β α α SPR









In their public goods experiment on endogenous institutional choice (carrot vs. stick), Sutter et al. (2010) find 
that subjects typically vote for the reward option. In this case, our analytical model shows that the three types  
coexist in positive, permanently fluctuating proportions (Figure 3). Such a dynamics qualitatively resembles 
one of the findings obtained in the well-known evolutionary paper on indirect reciprocity by Nowak and 
Sigmund (1998), where it is shown that long-term simulations that incorporate mutations usually do not 
converge  to  a  simple  equilibrium  distribution  of  strategies,  but  display  endless  cycles,  with  defectors, 
discriminators and cooperators. This is the only coexistence outcome we obtain (though we do not get an 
attractive stationary state with coexistence), with reference to both behavioral types (as selfish and non-selfish 
players coexist) and behavioral outcomes (as we observe both cooperation and defection, within the overall 
population). By contrast, all the other four varieties of strong reciprocity we investigate lead to the survival of 
either selfish or non-selfish (i.e. cooperators and/or strong reciprocators) players only, which either universal 
defection or universal cooperation is associated with.  
 
 
Figure 3: Social dynamics in a population of Cooperators, Defectors and Altruistic Rewarders 
 
 
Players driven by Symmetric Strong Reciprocity 
Let us now consider the dynamics associated with the case in which cooperators and defectors initially coexist 
with conditional cooperators displaying SSR, that is the combination of altruistic punishment (punishment of 
defectors) and altruistic rewarding (rewarding of cooperators; Fehr et al., 2002). In this case, the payoff matrix 
A is:  
 
β ε β γ UD
λ β α α SSR











Here, we find that the stationary state UD, where all players are defectors, is a global attractor in the interior 
of the simplex S (Figure 4). The strong result we obtain is that now complete free riding prevails regardless of 
the proportion of non-selfish players (SRs and UCs) initially present in the population. The intuition, in a 
nutshell, is that altruistic rewarding ‘crowds-out’ altruistic punishment. What happens in this case resembles 
the  well-known  dynamics  characterizing  a  classic  prey-predator  model,  but  within  a  cultural  evolution 
framework  in  which  different  cultural  orientations  compete  with  one  another  and  evolution  is  driven  by 
material payoffs. Within the behaviorally heterogeneous framework under study, SSR is maladaptive due to 
the key negative role played by the group of cooperators, as such players, by so doing, make themselves 
vulnerable and exploitable on the part of UDs, so favoring their evolutionary success. As we have seen by 
analyzing  SNR,  such  an  unpleasant  social  outcome  can  be  prevented  –  provided  that  ‘sufficiently  many’ 
punishers are initially present –, as SRs in that case abstain from rewarding cooperators. By contrast, with SSR 
universal defection prevails regardless of the initial share of SRs in the population. Since selection favors 
second-order free riders, strong reciprocity declines and eventually first-order free riders take over. This is a 
crucial point which, though speculatively made (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004) or investigated by means of 
exploratory  simulations  (Fehr  and  Fischbacher,  2003),  had  not  received  specific  attention  so  far  at  the 




Figure 4: Social dynamics in a population of Cooperators, Defectors  
and players driven by Symmetric Strong Reciprocity 
 
 
Punishers of (Non-Punishing) Cooperators  
Let us now turn to the dynamics associated with the existence of the ‘new’ form of strong reciprocity that we 
label Punishment of Non-Punishing Cooperators (PNP), as in this case strong reciprocators are willing to 
incur  costs  in  order  to  punish  cooperators  –  who  unconditionally  cooperate  but  fail  to  punish  defectors, 
therefore acting as second-order free riders – rather than defectors themselves (for a similar notion, see the 
seminal paper by Axelrod, 1986). The payoff matrix A, in this case, becomes:  
 
β β γ UD
β α λ α PNP







Recent evidence from experimental games confirms that cooperative subjects get heavily punished (see e.g. 
Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Herrmann et al., 2008; Goette et al., 2010; Abbink et al., 2010)
5. Also Gächter 
and  Herrmann  (2010),  in  their  large-scale  experiment  with  subjects  from  urban  and  rural  Russia,  find  a 
surprisingly high rate of punishment of cooperators: as they correctly point out, “Punishment of cooperators 
has been largely neglected in previous research on social preferences because it was negligible compared to 
the punishment of free riders. Our results show that this neglect is not warranted because punishment of 
cooperators can be very significant in some subject pools”. Our dynamic analysis for this case shows that now 
the pure population stationary state where everyone is a PNP is a global attractor in the interior of S and 
universal cooperation arises (Figure 5). Hence, such a seemingly paradoxical form of sanctioning turns out to 
be successful in both endogenously enforcing cooperation and being sustainable over time.  
 
                                                 
5 Well-known real-life examples of this form of sanctioning include employer’s liability for injuries resulting from acts by her 
employees within the scope of their duties as well as parents’ responsibility for harms to others caused by their younger children.  




We finally illustrate the dynamics in the context in which Hyper-Strong Negative Reciprocity (HSNR) is 
present in the population. HSNR is a form of strong reciprocity represented by the combination of SNR and 
PNP, as HSNRs abstain from rewarding other agents (unlike SPRs) and incur costs to punish both defectors 
and cooperators, that is both first-order and second-order free riders. The payoff matrix A associated to this 
case is:  
 
β ε β γ UD
λ β α λ α HSNR








When strong reciprocity takes the form of HSNR, so that SRs display both altruistic punishment of defectors 
and  punishment  of  non-punishers,  in  equilibrium  either  all  players  become  defectors,  so  that  universal 
defection occurs, or all players become HSNRs, so that cooperation flourishes (Figure 6). This case resembles 
the case of SNR, as also in such case we have found that initial conditions turn out to be crucial in order to 
determine  the  evolutionary  outcome.  The  key  difference,  however,  is  that  with  HSNR  the  cooperative 
equilibrium is less fragile than with SNR, as it is associated with a monomorphic population rather than with a 
polymorphic population that can be invaded by defectors
6.  
                                                 
6 The well-known phenomenon of so called ‘collective punishment’ provides us with abundant real-life evidence on this variety of 
strong reciprocity. For example, when something negative happens at school and neither the culprit confesses nor the innocent 
schoolboys  act  as  informers,  the  teacher  may  decide  to  punish  the  whole  class.  As  far  as  HSNR  is  concerned,  a  significant 
confirmation of its impact on the enforcement of cooperation in a multi-person prisoner’s dilemma is provided by simulation results 
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).  
 
 





4. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In recent years, the idea of strong reciprocity has been gaining more and more credit. The main reason of this 
seems to lie in the appeal of a notion of endogenous sanctioning based on people’s willingness to perform 
such actions despite the associated monetary costs. Experimental confirmations have generated even more 
interest towards this behavioral attitude. One of the major results of our evolutionary analysis, however, is that 
in  the  three-type  population  under  study,  where  defectors,  cooperators  and  strong  reciprocators  initially 
coexist,  if  strong  reciprocators  display  both  altruistic  punishment  and  altruistic  rewarding  (i.e.  SSR),  in 
equilibrium all cooperators and punishers perish, so that universal defection eventually prevails. This ‘paradox 
of strong reciprocity’, making a behavioral attitude such as SSR maladaptive and ineffective as a cooperation 
enforcement  device  is  due  to  the  ‘crowding-out  effect’  dynamically  produced  by  altruistic  rewarding  on 
altruistic punishment: rewarding second-order free riders (that is, cooperators) makes the latter vulnerable and 
indirectly  favors  the  expansion  of  first-order  free  riders  (that  is,  defectors),  who  effectively  exploit 
cooperators. This makes SSR unsustainable and leads to the demise of cooperation. Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2003) claimed that when cooperation in a population is widespread, altruistic punishers have only a small or 
no selective disadvantage relative to pure cooperators who abstain from punishing. However, insofar as strong 
reciprocity  means  not  only  costly  punishment  of  defectors  but  also  (symmetrically)  costly  rewarding  of 
cooperators,  our  study  reveals  that  –  when  the  proportion  of  cooperators  is  extremely  large  –  the  cost  
disadvantage of strong reciprocators is still relevant due to the fact that rewarding so many cooperators will be 
costly – though the costs of punishing defectors will be small, in such a circumstance. The second (causally 
related) problem is that such an increase of cooperators, together with the lack of a large number of strongly 
reciprocal players around, makes cooperators extremely vulnerable to the ‘attack’ of defectors, who exploit 
them and derive relevant advantages from this. This allows them to grow at the expense of cooperators and, 
eventually, to take over and make the monomorphic pure population equilibrium where all agents defect 
globally attractive.  
Withholding reward to cooperators significantly improves the situation: passing from SSR to SNR makes 
strong reciprocity less costly and cooperation sustainable through positive proportions of SRs and UCs. This is 
in line with what happens in an indirect reciprocity scenario, where individuals benefit from withholding help. 
We have also shown that when rewarding does not occur, punishing works better when both cooperators and 
defectors are sanctioned (under HSNR) than when defectors only are sanctioned (SNR), as in the latter case, 
even if costly rewarding does not occur, the locally attractive cooperative equilibria are fragile. However, the 
adaptive  power  of  strong  reciprocity,  as  well  as  its  capacity  to  favor  the  endogenous  enforcement  of 
cooperation, are even greater when such behavioral attitude takes the form of PNP only, that is when strong 
reciprocators simply sanction (non-punishing) cooperators and abstain from costly punishing defectors. On 
the whole, then, our comparative analysis establishes the evolutionary superiority of some varieties of strong 
reciprocity over others. We have seen that SNR, SPR and SSR perform badly and do not act as effective 
cooperation enforcement devices, when they have to compete evolutionarily with unconditional cooperation 
and  unconditional  defection.  By  contrast,  PNP  and  HSNR  survive  and succeed  in  enforcing  cooperation. 
Hence, once the inherently plural nature of strong reciprocity is taken into account, it is necessary to specify 
what  is  the  variety  of  strong  reciprocity  one  aims  at  incorporating  in  a  theoretical  model  based  on  type 
heterogeneity, as it would be otherwise impossible to draw unambiguous conclusions about the medium-long 
run stability of this behavioral attitude.  
Why is it the case that, within the same social environment and information scenario, some varieties of 
strong reciprocity are adaptive while others are not? In a nutshell, our study suggests the following unified 
answer: in a world in which defectors initially coexist with strong reciprocators and cooperators, the latter can 
(paradoxically) be an obstacle to the stability of cooperation. The existence of cooperators as prey provides 
benefits to defectors as predators. Hence, the best way for SRs to generate an environment of cooperation and 
avoid to perish is to try to drive the cooperators to extinction: we show that a strategy by which strongly 
reciprocal players punish cooperators is highly adaptive both on its own (i.e. PNP) and when combined with 
punishment of first-order free riders (i.e. HSNR). On the contrary, a strategy by which SRs reward cooperators 
is highly non-adaptive both on its own (i.e. SPR) and, even more so, when combined with punishment of  
defectors (i.e. SSR). The point is that due to both their being second-order free riders and their failing to 
reward others, seemingly nice guys such as unconditionally cooperative players are in fact not so nice and 
deserve the stick, rather than the carrot. These results are in line with recent theoretical work on indirect 
reciprocity
 (Ohtsuki et al., 2009) as well as with experimental evidence (Dreber et al., 2008), indicating that 
subjects who do not punish earn a lot (they are the ‘winners’), while punishers end up with low payoff levels 
(they are the ‘losers’). Hence, punishment of cooperators becomes itself socially beneficial and, therefore, 
‘altruistic’, while rewarding cooperators is socially harmful and can be viewed a ‘antisocial’.  
Our findings suggest that cooperation can emerge due to the crucial role played by strong reciprocity but 
also that, in societies with sizeable shares of unconditional cooperators, strong reciprocity can be successful 
insofar as it takes the form of ‘punishment of cooperators’. Such an evolutionary account of cooperation is 
based  on  an  individual  selection  framework  and  is  compatible  with  the  presence,  in  the  population,  of 
cooperative ‘good men’ who, by doing nothing, risk to favor the ‘triumph of evil’ (as the poet Burke famously 
put it): unlike theories of cooperation based on altruistic punishment of defectors only, this explanation takes 
into account the ‘dark’ side of (seemingly) other-regarding behavior and sheds light on the potential role of a 






We analyze dynamics (2) by using Bomze’s (1983) classification for replicator equations. In order to present 
social dynamics for all the five varieties of strong reciprocity we focus on, we have to consider five distinct 
material payoff matrices, in correspondence with the five three-type populations under study, on the basis of 
the material consequences from the two-stage PDCS game conveyed by Tables 1 and 2. All the five cases 
illustrated in the main text of the paper are analyzed on the basis of the propositions we state here below. In 
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This coordinate change is sometimes used in the analysis below. Furthermore, we make use of the same 
terminology  used  in  Bomze  (1983).  By  an  eigenvalue  EV  of  a  stationary  state  we  shall  understand  an 
eigenvalue of the linearization matrix around that stationary state. The term EV in direction of the vector V 
means that V is an eigenvector corresponding to that EV. IntS is the set { } 3   , 2   , 1    , 0 : = > Î i x S x i  in which all 
behavioral types are present in the population. An edge of S consists of all population states in which a given 
(fixed)  strategy  is  not  adopted;  we  shall  denote  ij K   the  edge  joining  i e   with  j e ,  where  ) 0 , 0 , 1 ( 1 = e , 
) 0 , 1 , 0 ( 2 = e ,  ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( 3 = e  are the vectors of the canonical basis;  1 e ,  2 e  and  3 e  represent the states in which in 
the population there are only UCs, SRs and UDs, respectively. Thus e.g.  12 K  is the edge where only types UC 
and SR are present in the population. Note that, by (5),  12 K  corresponds to the positive semi-axis  0 = y  of the 
plane (x,y) and  13 K  corresponds to the positive semi-axis 0 = x . 
The stability properties of the vertices  1 e ,  2 e  and  3 e  (indicated, respectively, by UC, SR and UD in Figures 2-
6)  are  analyzed  in  the  following  proposition
8.  For  simplicity,  the  propositions  in  Bomze  (1983)  will  be 
indicated as B# (so, e.g., B4 is Proposition 4 of Bomze’s paper). 
 
Proposition 1 The eigenvalue structure of the stationary states  i e  is the following: 
(1)  1 e  has one eigenvalue with the sign of  a in direction of  12 K  and one eigenvalue with the sign of  d  in 
direction of  13 K . 
(2)  2 e  has one eigenvalue with the sign of  b -  in direction of  12 K  and one eigenvalue with the sign of  b e-  
in direction of  23 K . 
                                                 
7 It is a well-known result that dynamics (2) does not change if an arbitrary constant is added to each column of A (see e.g. Hofbauer 
and Sigmund, 1988; p. 126).  
8 All the eigenvalues of the stationary stateson the edges of S are real (see Bomze, 1983).  
(3)  3 e  has one eigenvalue with the sign of  f -  in direction of  13 K  and one eigenvalue with the sign of  f c -  
in direction of  23 K . 
Proof. See B1. 
 
The following proposition concerns the stationary states on the edges of S. 
 
Proposition 2 (1)  12 K  is pointwise fixed
9 if and only if (iff)  0 = = b a . There is a unique the stationary state in 
the interior of  12 K  iff  0 < ab . In the remaining cases, there are no the stationary states in it. The eigenvalues 
of  the  unique  the  stationary  state  (when  existing)  have  the  sign  of  a -   in  direction  of  12 K   and  of 
b ae bd / ) ( - in direction of the interior of S. 
(2) There are not the stationary states in  13 K . 
(3) There is a unique the stationary state in the interior of  23 K  iff  0 ) )( ( < - - c f b e . In the remaining cases, 
there are not the stationary states in  23 K . The eigenvalues of the unique the stationary state in the interior of 
23 K  have the sign of  ) /( ) )( ( f c b e c f b e - + - - -  in direction of  23 K  and of  ) /( ) ( f c b e ce bf - + - -  in 
direction of the interior of S. 
Proof. Apply B2 and B5. 
 
The  remaining  proposition  concerns  the  stationary  states  in  the  interior  of  S,  where  all  behavioral  types 
coexist. 
 
Proposition 3 There is a unique the stationary state in IntS iff the expressions: 
ce bf -   bd ae-   af cd -           (6) 
have all the same sign and are not equal to zero. 
If they are all zero, then there is a pointwise fixed line  { } 0 : ) , ( = + + = + + = fy ex d cy bx a y x G  in IntS (if the 
intersection between G and the positive quadrant of the plane  ) , ( y x  is not empty). In the remaining cases, 
there are not stationary states in IntS. 
Proof. Apply B6. 
 
Strong Negative Reciprocity (SNR) 
                                                 
9 The term pointwise fixed means that all the points of such an edge are stationary states.  
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In this case, by Propositions 1-3, we have that  3 e (where all players are UDs) is always locally attractive and 
the edge  12 K  (where UDs are not present) is always pointwise fixed. Furthermore, there is always an isolated 
stationary state in the edge  23 K  which has two positive eigenvalues if  d b l - > , one positive eigenvalue (in 
direction of  23 K ) and one negative eigenvalue in direction of IntS if  d b l - < . In the interior of S there are 











- =             (7) 
iff  d b l - = .  Looking  at  all  possible  dynamic  regimes  showed  in  Bomze  (1983),  we  can  classify  the 
dynamics in a UC-SNR-UD population. In particular, if  d b l - < we have the phase portrait number 28 in 
Bomze’s (1983) classification (Bpp#, hereafter); if  d b l - =  we obtain Bpp3 and if  d b l - >  we obtain 
Bpp23. For simplicity, in the paper we show only the dynamics related to the latter case (for the other two 
cases, qualitative dynamics is very similar). Consequently, in a UC-SNR-UD population, a bi-stable dynamics 
always emerges: the trajectories in the interior of S converge either to the stationary state  3 e , where all players 
are UDs, or to the edge  12 K , where UDs disappear and UCs and SNRs coexist (see Figure 2). 
The following proposition leads to an intuitive result concerning the variations of the basins of attraction of  3 e  
and  12 K when the parameter ɛ (capturing defectors’ cost of being punished by strong reciprocators) varies. 
 
Proposition  4  As  ɛ  increases,  the  basin  of  attraction  of  the  stationary  state  3 e   gets  smaller  and,  as  a 
consequence, the basin of attraction of  12 K  gets larger. 
Proof. In the case of SNR, if we write the dynamics in the coordinates (x,y) (see (5)), we obtain: 
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Let us first consider the case  d b l - < ; the basins of attraction of  3 e and  12 K are separated by the unique 
trajectories converging to the stationary state on the edge  23 K  (see Bpp28 in Bomze, 1983). From (9) we get 
that passing from  1 e  to  2 e , with  2 1 e e < , we obtain: 







This implies that the trajectory  G converging to the stationary state in  23 K  for  1 e e =  gets crossed top-down 
from the trajectories of (8) for  2 e e = . This implies that the basin of  3 e  gets smaller and the basin of  12 K  gets 
larger, passing from  1 e  to  2 e . 
Let us now turn to the case  d b l - =  (see Bpp3 in Bomze, 1983); the basins of attraction of  3 e  and  12 K  are 
separated by the line (7). Since such line shifts upward (in the positive quadrant of the plane (x, y)) as ɛ 
grows, we proved the proposition for such a dynamic regime as well.  
Let us now turn to the case  d b l - > ; in this case, there is only one trajectory starting from the stationary 
state in  23 K  (which is a repulsive) tangent to the edge  12 K ; the part  F of this trajectory that goes from the 
stationary  state  in  23 K   to  the  edge  12 K   separates  the  basins  of  attraction  of  3 e   and  of  12 K .  Since  for 
d b l - > we have: 







then the trajectory  F for  1 e e =  gets crossed top-down from the trajectories of (8) for  2 e e = . This implies 
that the basin of  3 e  gets smaller and the basin of  12 K  gets larger in passing from  1 e  to  2 e . 
 
Strong Positive Reciprocity (SPR) 
In order to avoid a lengthy presentation of our calculations, we omit to write the payoff matrices B for this 
case and for the following ones (the payoff matrices A are given in the main text). The procedure that allows 
us to set them up should be clear now. The dynamics in a UC-SPR-UD population is characterized by the 
following properties. There are not stationary states in the edges  ij K  of S and all the vertices  i e  are saddle 
points. Furthermore, there always exists one stationary state in the interior of S; by applying Corollary 7 of B6 
in  Bomze  (1983),  it  is  easy  to  show  that  such  a  point  is  a  source.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  UC-SPR-UD  
population,  we  have  the  regime  shown  in  Figure  3:  all  trajectories  approach  the  boundary  of  S  turning 
clockwise. 
 
Symmetric Strong Reciprocity (SSR) 
We have that  3 e (where all players are UDs) is always locally attractive. There are not stationary states in the 
edges  12 K and  13 K ;  there  is  always  an  isolated  stationary  state  in  the  edge  23 K   which  has  one  positive 
eigenvalue in direction of  23 K . In the interior of S, pointwise fixed lines do not exist (being  0 > -bd ae  
always)  and  one  stationary  state  exists  iff  ) ( ) )( ( d b h b h e a l d b - > - + + - - ;  in  the  other  cases,  no 
stationary state exists in the interior of S. Consequently, by Bomze’s classification, we obtain two dynamic 
regimes. In particular, when there exists a stationary state in the interior of S, the dynamic regime is Bpp15 in 
Bomze (1983); if it does not exist, the dynamic regime is the one showed in Figure 3. In both dynamic 
regimes, the stationary  state  3 e  is globally attractive, so that we obtain the result illustrated in the paper. 
 
Punishment of Non-Punishing Cooperators (PNP) 
In this context, the stationary state  2 e  (where all  players  are PNPs) is  always attractive while the other 
vertices are saddles; there are not stationary states in the edges  13 K and  23 K  and there is always one stationary 
state in  12 K  which has a positive eigenvalue in direction of  12 K . Furthermore, there is a unique stationary 
state in the interior of S iff  ) ( ) ( g a e a e b l - < - + ; in such a case, the stationary state in  12 K  is a saddle. If 
) ( ) ( g a e a e b l - ³ - + , there are not stationary states in the interior of S and the stationary state in  12 K  is 
repulsive.  If  the  interior  stationary  state  exists,  the  associated  dynamic  regime  is  Bpp15;  otherwise,  the 
dynamic regime is the one showed in Figure 5. In both regimes, the stationary state  2 e  is a global attractor. 
 
Hyper-Strong Negative Reciprocity (HSNR) 
Here, the vertices  2 e  (where all players are HSNRs) and  3 e  (where all players are UDs) are always attractive 
while  1 e  is always a saddle. There are not stationary states in  13 K  and there is one stationary state in  12 K  and 
one in  23 K ; both these stationary states have a positive eigenvalue in direction of  12 K  and  23 K , respectively. 
The  dynamic  regimes,  in  the  case  of  a  UC-HSNR-UD  population,  depend  on  the  sign  of  the  following 
expressions (see Proposition 3): 
 
        ) )( ( ) ( l d b b a d b e - - - + - = -ce bf  
        ) ( ) ( g a e b a l - + - = -bd ae   
        ) ( ) )( ( d b l l d b a g - + - - - = - af cd  
 
In particular, we have the following sub-cases:  
1) If 0 > -ce bf ,  0 > -bd ae ,  0 > - af cd , then there exists one stationary state in the interior of S which 
is  repulsive  (see  B6  and  Corollary  7)  and  the  stationary  states  in  12 K   and  in  23 K   are  saddles.  The 
corresponding dynamic regime is Bpp9.  
2) If  0 = - = - = - af cd bd ae ce bf , then there exists one pointwise fixed line in the interior of S joining 
the stationary states in  12 K  and in  23 K . The corresponding dynamic regime is Bpp5.  
3)  0 < -ce bf ,  0 < -bd ae ,  0 < - af cd , then there exists one stationary state in the interior of S which is 
a saddle (see B6 and Corollary 7) and the stationary states in  12 K  and in  23 K  are repulsive. The corresponding 
dynamic regime is Bpp10.  
4) If  0 > -ce bf ,  0 £ -bd ae ,  af cd - "  , then there are not stationary states in the interior of S, the 
stationary state in  12 K  is repulsive and that in  23 K  is a saddle point. The corresponding dynamic regime is 
Bpp37.  
5) If  0 £ -ce bf ,  0 > -bd ae ,  af cd - "  , then there are not stationary states in the interior of S, the 
stationary state in  12 K  is a saddle point and that in  23 K  is repulsive. The corresponding dynamic regime is 
Bpp38.  
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